SCARE OF RADIOACTIVE JAPANESE PRODUCTS!

Customs officials have stopped 300 radioactive cars from getting into Russia
from Japan. After the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, Putin has dictated a
monitoring mission on all imports from Japan. Inspectors are keeping a watchful
eye on all Japanese imports entering Russia through its far eastern border.

Russia imports very few food products from Japan. Fish caught off the shores of
Japan show radioactive signs. In August, Russia's Consumer Rights Organization
will mount a scientific expedition with the support of the Russian Geographical
Society, to establish if in fact there is a health threat from the fish stock
off Japan's coast.

There is a global scare of Japanese products now. With the earthquake aftermath
focusing on Fukushima power plant and possible
worst-case scenarios, the question of safety in nuclear energy has returned to
the forefront of many people's minds around the world. Naoto Kan had announced
that his government will be starting from scratch with its energy plans and the
country's reliance on nuclear power following the crisis. For ten years, the
Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for
worker exposure to radiation and one of the three worst nuclear plants in the
world!

Japanese brands have lost their good will due to radioactivity scare. After the
Fukushima accident, we need to reconsider the cost of nuclear power.
It's not enough to meet safety standards. The industry needs to search for the
best performance. The Fukushima reactor has long held the potential for an
incident of this nature, being an old power plant with a flawed design, which
doesn't reflect contemporary nuclear capability.

The safety standards that these old reactors were built to are nothing like
today's standards. Fukushima is the second oldest Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) in
the world, completed in 1971. Some of these early models have a weak design. At
the very time you need the containment facility to protect you, when the core is
overheating, you have to vent pressure and consequently possible radiation to
prevent explosion.

The earthquake didn't damage the reactors themselves, but did take out mains
electricity. The ensuing tsunami knocked out the diesel generators and other
back-up systems that were used to pump water around the core, keeping it cool.
Once that power failed, the core overheated and was critically damaged a mere 26
hours after the tidal wave hit.

Japan's two lost decades is a lesson for Occident. Derek Scissors points out
that if Japan finally made headway on its economic woes, it could provide a
blueprint for others in similar situations. Unfortunately, such progress appears
unlikely. Japan has struggled with political obstacles to debt reduction, as
many other countries are now. There is a widespread belief, clung to despite all
evidence to the contrary, that deficit spending stimulates economic growth. This
must be dispelled in order for Japan or any country to take the necessary fiscal
steps toward recovery. 

Scissors notes Japan's fall from economic leadership in the early 1990s was not
at all due to fiscal policy. The ensuing years of stagnation and decline in
comparative living standard, though, are intertwined with fiscal failure. With a
shrinking labor force and limited land endowment, Japan cannot grow while the
return on capital is low and innovation is weak. Yet this is exactly what to
expect from an excessive state role in the economy and mass government borrowing
at near-zero interest rates.